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I.

INTRODUCTION

What happens when an individual is diagnosed with a disease for which
there is no specific discernable cause? While scientists and physicians are busy
conducting research and searching for diagnoses to answer this question,
American courtrooms are struggling to determine the answer so that they can
properly assign liability in toxic tort litigation.' In the absence of the exacting
science that courts crave,2 decisions in toxic tort cases are often based on mere
inferences. Professor Gary Marchant describes toxic tort litigation as a "black
hole of ignorance and uncertainty that judges and juries must venture to resolve
whether a particular exposure caused an individual plaintiff's illness."'4 Genetic
research has the ability to supply courts with conclusive evidence of plaintiffs'

1.
See Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to Compel
Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 961 (2010) ("The application of Daubert in toxic
tort cases has led many courts to reject proposed expert testimony, particularly that proffered by
plaintiffs, as too unreliable in light of scientific uncertainty and incomplete scientific knowledge.").
2. See Christiana P. Callahan, Note, Molecular Epidemiology: Future Proof of Toxic Tort
Causation, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 147, 161 (2001) (citing Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 661,
664 (M.D. La. 2000)) (stating that epidemiological evidence does "not directly demonstrate [the]
causal link," but instead "show[s] that occurrence of the disease is more common among those
exposed to the toxin than those who are not").
3.
See Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 7, 7-8
(2006) (stating that "[mlost disease conditions have multiple potential etiologies, and there is
usually no direct evidence of which possible cause produced the disease in a specific individual,"
and that "the outcome in such toxic tort cases is often uncertain, contentious, and unjust"); see also
Smith v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 696 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (finding that general
causation could reasonably be inferred from expert testimony offered by plaintiff (citing Michael D.
Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
333, 375 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2d ed. 2000))).
4.
Marchant, supra note 3, at 7.
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injuries, thereby improving courts'
ability to accurately measure and assign
5
litigation.
tort
toxic
in
liability
Parties involved in toxic tort litigation face unique challenges in
establishing, and defending against, the claims involved. 6 Unlike traditional
products liability cases where a plaintiff alleges that a defect in a durable good,
such as an automobile, caused her injury, 7 toxic tort cases deal with alleged
defects in products like prescription drugs and injuries from diseases like
cancer. 9 Thus, even in the most complex products liability case, a court is much
more likely to have access to tangible evidence to establish causation than it is
when dealing with a toxic tort case in which it must determine the cause of a°
complex medical disease for which there may be numerous potential causes.
For these reasons, toxic tort litigation is uniquely dependent on scientific
advances that can provide courts with an understanding of the relationship
between the human body and exposure to outside substances, like prescription
drugs. 11 Given the fact that people are increasingly exposed to thousands of
chemicals in the environment,1 2 toxic tort litigation is naturally growing 13 as

5.
See id. at 8.
6. See Lin, supra note 1, at 965 ("Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases, however, face numerous
obstacles to bringing successful claims, particularly as to issues of causation.").
7.
See, e.g., Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1998)
(plaintiff brought product liability action against automobile manufacturer alleging that the air bag
was defectively designed).
8.
See, e.g., Smith, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 688, 691 (plaintiff brought claim against prescription
drug manufacturer alleging that drug caused her to develop primary pulmonary hypertension).
9.
See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL
775340, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 1998) (plaintiffs brought claim seeking damages for injuries
including cancer), rev'd, 292 F:3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 7; see also John C. Childs, Toxicogenomics: New Chapter
in Causation and Exposure in Toxic Tort Litigation, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 441, 441 (2002) ("Most
toxic tort litigation involves diseases, such as cancer, for which there are numerous possible causes
and where there is little objective, scientific proof that the claimant's disease was caused by the
alleged exposure.").
11. See Steve C. Gold, The More We Know, the Less Intelligent We Are?-How Genomic
Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort Causation Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 369, 397 (2010) ("[T]he legal significance of advancing scientific knowledge will continue to
be tested in personal injury actions brought by people who allege that their exposure to drugs,
workplace chemicals, pollutants, or other agents caused their disease.").
12. See Elizabeth B. Forsyth, Note, Solving Widespread Toxic Chemical Exposure: A Taxing
Job, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 115, 118 (2011) (citing Gertrud S. Berkowitz et al., The Rationale for a
National Prospective Cohort Study of Environmental Exposure and Childhood Development, 85
ENVTL. RES. 59, 60 (2001)) (stating that "[t]here are more than 80,000 synthetic chemicals on the
market in the United States, the majority of which have been developed since World War IP'); see
also Alan Heaton, Introduction, in THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 1, 2 (Alan Heaton ed., 2d ed. 1994)
(noting that the chemical industry "makes thousands of different chemicals which the general public
only usually encounter as end or consumer products").
13. Martha A. Churchill, Toxic Torts: Proofof Medical Monitoring Damagesfor Exposure to
Toxic Substances, in 25 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 313, 322-24 (1994) ("In less than a decade,
environmental toxic tort law has developed from an unknown and obscure branch of litigation to a
full blown legal specialty. Toxic tort litigation is increasing rapidly ....).
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individuals seek to hold potential wrongdoers responsible for causing their
injuries.
This Note will show how genetic evidence can improve the accuracy of
courts' decisions in toxic tort cases by providing specific information about
plaintiffs' exposures to certain substances and any effects of such exposures.
Part II of this Note provides background information on the study of human
genetics. Part HI then analyzes the challenges that exist in toxic tort litigation
today and discusses the ways it will be impacted by the introduction of genetic
evidence. Finally, Part IV briefly discusses the ongoing debate about the use of
genetic evidence in toxic tort litigation and concludes with recommendations for
its use. Ultimately, as genetic research provides new information on the causes
of human diseases, 14 toxic tort law stands to benefit from courts' improved

ability to use this information to more accurately assign responsibility for
injuries.
I.

BACKGROUND ON HUMAN GENETICS

In 2003, scientists announced the completion of the Human Genome Project
(HGP)15 and presented the world with the first complete map of the human
genome.16 Designed "to improve our understanding of health and genetic
disease"' t 7 by determining the causes of widespread diseases like cancer,18 the
to be one of the greatest scientific achievements in history. 19

HGP is considered
20anha
So far, the HGP has led to the discovery of over 1,800 disease genes and has
revealed connections between certain genetic mutations and over 6,000

14. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 148 ("[E]pidemiological studies could help establish the
causal link between exposure and injury ....").
15. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic
Information NondiscriminationAct, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 442 (2010) (citing Major Events in the
U.S. Human Genome Project and Related Projects, OAK RIDGE NAT'L LAB., http://www.ornl.
gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/project/timeline.shtml (last modified Sept. 19, 2011)).
16. See Michael J. Malinowski et al., Acknowledgement, Symposium: Proceedings of "The
Genomics Revolution? Science, Law and Policy," 66 LA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 2 (2005).
17. Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the Second
Generationof Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 860 (2007) (citing An Overview
of the Human Genome Project, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.
genome.gov/12011238 (last updated Oct. 13, 2011)).
18. See Nicholas Wade, Disease Cause is Pinpointed With Genome, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2010, http://www.nytimes.con/2010/03/1 1/health/research/i lgene.html.
19. See Lauren Elizabeth Nuffort, The Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct of 2008:
Raising a Shield to Genetic Discriminationin Employment and Health Insurance, 21 HEALTH LAW,
no. 5, June 2009 at 1, 1 (quoting InternationalConsortium Completes Human Genome Project, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 14, 2003, 1:00 PM), http://www.nih.gov/
news/pr/apr2003/nhgri-14.htm) (describing the Human Genome Project as a "thirteen-year
milestone in genomics").
20. Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Is It the
Practiceof Medicine?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369,369 (2009).
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biological disorders, including multiple cancers. 21 Additionally, the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences launched a similar project in 1998,
the Environmental Genome Project (EGP), "to understand the relationship
between environmental exposures and disease. 2 2 The EGP has successfully
"identified over 500 putative environmental susceptibility genes" and continues
to study changes in genes that cause individuals to become susceptible or
resilient to certain toxic substances.23

Discoveries in genetic research are advancing our understanding of the
interaction between the human body and outside substances, such as chemicals
found in the water we drink, the food we eat, and the medicines we take.24
Scientists have discovered certain "[glene expression biomarkers" that provide
evidence of a person's exposure to particular substances, 5 and a field of study
known as "molecular

epidemiology

26

has developed to evaluate these

biomarkers in order "to evaluate the damage done by toxic substances. 27
Science has further uncovered the existence of certain types of biomarkers that
can go beyond supglying proof that an individual has been exposed to a
particular substance. These biomarkers can measure the level of exposure that
occurred, 29 determine the effects of the exposure, 30 and provide information

21. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 443 n.6 (citing Carolyne Park, Genetics Offers Tool in
Combat of Cancer: Field Young, Pays Off in Early Detection, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 24,
2008, at Al); see also Callahan, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Harri Vainio, Promise of Molecular
Epidemiology-Epidemiologic Reasoning, Biological Rationale and Risk Assessment, 25
SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK ENvTL. HEALTH 498, 500 (1999)) (stating that "[tioxic substances can
also cause mutations at the genetic level," and that "[m]utations in certain genes are specifically
associated with cancer causation").
22. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 165 (citing Environmental Genome Project: Program
Description, NAT'L INST. OF ENVTL. HEALTH SCIENCES, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/
supported/programs/egp/ (last viewed Feb. 6, 2009)).
23. Marchant, supra note 3, at 9 (citing Jocelyn Kaiser, Tying Genetics to the Risk of
Environmental Diseases, 300 SCIENCE 563, 563 (2003); Julie Wakefield, Environmental Genome
Project: Focusing on Differences to Understand the Whole, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A757,
A758 (2002)).
24. See Gold, supra note 11, at 397 ("[T]he legal significance of advancing scientific
knowledge will continue to be tested in personal injury actions brought by people who allege that
their exposure to drugs, workplace chemicals, pollutants, or other agents caused their disease.").
25. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 24.
26. Callahan, supra note 2, at 147 (citing Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: On
the Path to Prevention?, 92 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 602, 602 (2000)) (describing molecular
epidemiology as "an area of research founded in the early 1980s for the purpose of investigating
cancer risk at the molecular or genetic level").
27. Id. at 151 (citing Vainio, supra note 21, at 498).
28. See id. at 151-55 (citations omitted) (describing various types of biomarkers).
29. See id. at 152 (citing Frederica P. Perera & I. Bernard Weinstein, Molecular
Epidemiology: Recent Advances and Future Directions, 21 CARCINOGENESIS 517, 518 (2000))
("The most common biomarkers are those that are used to measure the internal dose of a
toxin .... These markers have been used to measure exposure to several types of toxins, including
cigarette smoke, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and aflatoxin.").
30. See id. at 153-54 (citing Vainio, supra note 21, at 499-501) (describing the ability of
environmental toxins and toxic substances to cause chromosomal and genetic mutations).
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about whether an individual's disease can be attributed to such exposure. 1
Additionally, aside from uncovering new information linking human disease to
about human genes
toxic substances, genetic research is providing information
32
themselves and their own propensity to cause diseases.
Moreover, genetic research has also revealed information about various

types of genetic susceptibilities to disease that may predispose certain

individuals to developing particular diseases 33 or increase their chances of
experiencing adverse reactions to particular substances. 34 While an individual's
genetic composition alone may lead him or her to develop a disease,
"environmental susceptibility 3genes" increase an individual's susceptibility to
outside environmental toxins.

Thus, these environmental susceptibility genes

can cause genes to act in ways that they would not otherwise act when they are
exposed to outside factors. 36 Additionally, there are genes that protect the body
by "enhancing tumor suppression, DNA repair, or detoxification, or interfering
with activation pathways." 37 Taken together, scientific information about these
genes will increase our understanding of the effects of toxic substances and
allow courts to better determine the cause of injuries presented in toxic tort
claims.
III. ToxIc TORT LITIGATION AND ITS FUTURE WITH GENETIC INFORMATION
Penny Plaintiff is a fifty-six-year-old resident of South Carolina who was
recently diagnosed with a rare form of leukemia. While the cause of her
leukemia has so far eluded the medical community, Penny is convinced that her
use of the prescription drug Valtor is to blame. Therefore, Penny wishes to bring
a toxic tort claim against the manufacturer of Valtor, Columbia Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (Columbia). How can Penny establish this claim? Her success will greatly
depend not only on her ability to access scientific information about the general
use of Valtor, but more importantly, it will depend 38on her ability to present
conclusive evidence about Valtor's effect on her body.

31. See id. at 153 (citing Perera, supra note 26, at 605).
32. See generally Susan R. Poulter, Genetic Testing in Toxic Injury Litigation: The Path to
Scientific Certainty or Blind Alley?, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 211, 216 (2001) (discussing the
development of tests for genetic predispositions to disease).
33. Id. at214-15.
34. See id. at 219 n.41 (discussing the role of genetics in increasing one's susceptibility to
allergies).
35.

See

id.

at

214-15

(citing

NAT'L

CANCER

INST.,

NAT'L

INST.

OF

HEALTH,

UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING 11-12 (1997)) ("[A] number of specific genetic mutations or
variations have been associated with various diseases, from Alzheimer's disease to cancers of
various kinds.").
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 156-57 (citing GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART
MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 342-44 (1994)) (discussing requirement

that plaintiffs must prove generic and individual causation).
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Toxic Tort Litigation Today

Americans face increasing health risks due to the growing presence of toxic
substances in the environment, 39 and new evidence continues to reveal
associations between individuals' exposures to certain substances and the
development of particular diseases. 4° Not surprisingly, toxic tort litigation has
filled court dockets throughout the United States as injured parties, like PennY,
seek relief for injuries allegedly caused by their exposure to certain substances.
Unfortunately, while there is increasing evidence connecting chemical exposure
42
to certain diseases, toxic tort litigation continues to be plagued by uncertainties
and evidence that fails to establish the products' alleged defects and causation
between these defects and the plaintiffs' injuries.43

Penny's claim will be especially difficult to establish for three reasons.
First, prescription drug manufacturers are widely protected from defective design
claims44 because prescription drugs are considered to be "unavoidably unsafe
products."'45 Thus, courts have generally determined that, while prescription
drugs carry inherent dangers of harming users, their benefits to human health
outweigh the risks of such dangers. 46 Thus, in the absence of manufacturing and
warning defects, prescription drugs are normally considered not defective and
manufacturers are protected from related strict liability and negligence claims.4 7

39. See supra note 12.
40. See Forsyth, supra note 12, at 120 ('There is also increasing evidence of association
between chemical exposure and diseases such as cancer and conditions such as autism, infertility,
and birth defects. Advances in science have shown both new links between specific diseases and
specific chemicals, and a general increase in disease and disorders potentially linked to widespread
pervasive exposure to toxic chemicals." (footnotes omitted)).
41. See DANIEL J. SMITH, Products Liability-FormaldehydeFumes Emitted by Building
Materials, in 3 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 225, 287 (1989) (describing "[tjhe explosion of toxic
tort litigation").
42. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 7 ("When the question in a toxic tort case is whether a
particular toxic substance caused injury in a specific individual, the data gaps and uncertainties are
even greater.").
43. See Forsyth, supra note 12, at 122 (listing "insurmountable obstacles to proving
causation" as one of the "three main obstacles the tort system presents that have made it unable to
offer relief from widespread chemical exposure").
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f (1998) ("Given this very
demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be imposed only under unusual circumstances.").
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (describing "unavoidably
unsafe products" as "products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable
of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use" and finding that "[tihese are especially
common in the field of drugs").
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. b ("The traditional refusal by courts to
impose tort liability for defective designs of prescription drugs and medical devices is based on the
fact that a prescription drug or medical device entails a unique set of risks and benefits. What may
be harmful to one patient may be beneficial to another.").
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k ("Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonablydangerous.... The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are
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Second, while defective warning claims dominate prescription drug
litigation, 48 toxic tort plaintiffs must combat the fact that a drug manufacturer's
duty to warn is generally limited to warning about foreseeable risks of harm
posed by its product.49 Based on this limited duty to warn, drug manufacturers50
dangers,
have traditionally been shielded from any duty to warn of unknowable
as well as from any duty to warn individuals with unusual susceptibilities to their
drugs. 5 1 Regarding the duty to warn only of foreseeable dangers, a drug
manufacturer will only be held liable for design and warning defect claims if a
court determines that, prior to selling its product, the manufacturer failed to carry
out its responsibility to perform reasonable testing to discover risks that such
testing would have revealed.52 Thus, liability for any dangers that are discovered
after the manufacturer sells the drug will be viewed in this context, and a
plaintiff like Penny will be faced with the difficult burden of establishing that the
danger could have been discovered prior to such sale.
Additionally, many plaintiff's claims are significantly damaged by evidence53
that their unusual susceptibilities are partly to blame for causing their injuries.
Just as a drug manufacturer is not required to discover everys5possible danger
associated with its product before placing it on the market, it is also not
required to discover every potential person that might be harmed by using the
product. 55 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides that

"[tihe general rule in cases involving allergic reactions is that a warning is
required when the harm-causing ingredient is one to which a substantial number

properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not
to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use ....").
48. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODuCTS LIABILITY LAW 627 n.3 (2d ed. 2008) ("Failure to warn or
instruct is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices."
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. d) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(c); see also Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1049 (Kan. 1984) ("The duty of the ethical drug manufacturer to warn is
limited to those dangers which the manufacturer knows, or has reason to know, are inherent in the
use of its drug." (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
50. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 315 (8th ed. 2008) ("[T]he
vast majority of courts today refuse to impose a duty on manufacturers to warn of unknowable
risks ....).
51. See OWEN, supra note 48, at 738 ("[C]omment k [to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]
provides that there is no duty to warn of risks of unforeseeable allergic reactions.").
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a.
53. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 14 ("Another set of legal issues will revolve around the
duty of a product manufacturer to protect or warn genetically susceptible individuals in the
population.").
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a.
55. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 15 ('"he Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
liability can only be imposed for adverse effects that would be suffered by a 'normal' person, and
thus the plaintiffs own allegation that she was unusually susceptible precluded her claim." (citing
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1154 (4th Cir. 1996))).
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of persons are allergic."' 56 Therefore, despite a couple of exceptions to this rule,
which are discussed below, 57 if Penny is found to be unusually susceptible to
harm caused by Valtor, Columbia will likely prevail against any claim of
defective design or warning by asserting the "'idiosyncratic response' defense,"
i.e., by arguing that manufacturers have no duty to warn of risks
that are
58
remotely possible to individuals with rare allergies or susceptibilities.
Finally, toxic tort plaintiffs experience the most difficulty in establishing
causation. 9 Here, the burden of proof is often insurmountable due in large part
to the lack of available scientific information to show that a particular drug is
capable of causing the injury at issue and that it, in fact, caused the plaintiff's
particular injury.
Toxic tort plaintiffs and defendants have been forced to
defend their arguments using scientific methodologies that are incapable of
providing concrete evidence of causation. 6'
Consider, for instance,
epidemiological studies, which are widely considered to be the preferred method

of proving causation in toxic tort litigation. 62 Because these studies present
information about "the incidence, distribution, and etiology of disease in human
populations,

63

they can be used to show general causation by presenting

evidence of a general causal relationship between exposure to a substance and
development of a particular disease.
However, because epidemiological
studies cannot directly attribute the cause of an individual's disease to her
exposure 65
to a specific substance, they cannot effectively establish specific
causation.

56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. k.
57. See infra Part II.A.1.
58. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 14 (describing the idiosyncratic response defense as
traditionally applying "to protect a manufacturer from liability for a product. . . that appears safe to
the general population but may cause an unusual response in individuals with a rare allergy or
sensitivity to the product").
59. See, e.g., Craig A. Barr, A Practical Guide to Proving and Disproving Causation in
Radiation Exposure Cases: Hanford Nuclear Site and Radioactive Iodine, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 2
(1996).
60. See Lin, supra note 1, at 965-66 ("Because of the extensive research required, the
probabilistic nature of research results, and the uncertainty often associated with those results,
plaintiffs are rarely in a position to prove either general or specific causation.").
61. See id.
62. See Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (M.D. La. 2000) ("[T]he most
conclusive type of evidence of causation is epidemiological evidence." (citing Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989))).
63. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in ANNOTATED REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 469, 471 (Michael J. Saks et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
64. Callahan, supra note 2, at 157.
65. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 59, at 14 ("Another disadvantage is that epidemiological
studies are generalistic in nature." (citing DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945
& n.6 (3rd Cir. 1990))).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss4/11

8

Hite: Who's to Blame: How Genetic Information Will Lead to More Accurat

20121

GENETIC INFORMATION IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION

1039

Next, consider toxicological studies, which are often used in conjunction
with epidemiological and other studies to establish general causation. 66 Because
toxicological research is performed on animals and in test tubes, 67 and not often
68
6
and often exclude them
on humans, courts have viewed them with skepticism 69
70
from evidence in toxic tort cases.
Parties have additionally relied on clinical,
or case, reports offered by their expert medical witnesses to establish causation. 7I

Physicians publish these reports and their focus is usually limited to an
individual's reaction to a particular substance. 72 Therefore, as opposed to
providing a broad understanding of a substance's effect on a large group of
people, clinical reports only provide the court with one example of how a
particular substance could affect a person. 73 Therefore, just like toxicological
studies, 74 courts often consider these reports to be unreliable as scientific

evidence of causation, and they are generally never sufficient to establish
causation on their own. 75

While the above three scientific methodologies, if admitted in toxic tort
76
litigation, are generally limited to serving as evidence of general causation,
differential diagnosis is commonly employed by expert witnesses to establish

66. See id. at 19 ("[A]nimal studies, much like epidemiological studies, can only demonstrate
general causation.").
67. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 113 (2011).
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972, 1026 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
("[Alnimal studies alone are not, under the circumstances of this case, sufficiently reliable medical
or scientific evidence to prove that a chemical causes human illness or disease." (citing Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992); Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d
718, 721-23 (6th Cir. 1989); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241
(E.D.N.Y. 1985))).
70. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 158; see also Barr, supra note 59, at 18 ("The general trend
is to exclude animal studies from evidence at trial.").
71. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 159 ("Plaintiffs also use clinical or case reports to show
that exposure to a particular toxin caused injury.").
72. See id. (citing Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316 (lth Cir. 1999)); see
also Smith v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695 (W.D.N.C. 2003) ("These are
reports in medical journals describing clinical events involving one individual or a few individuals.
They report unusual or new disease presentations ... or external causes of diseases.").
73. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 159 ('These reports are problematic as proof of causation
because they are only about one patient, who could have had an unusual reaction to the exposure."
(citing Allison, 184 F.3d at 1316)).
74. See id. at 158.
75. See, e.g., Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(quoting Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995)) (finding case
reports insufficient to establish causation); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d
1230, 1237 (W.D. Okla. 2000) (finding the case reports relied upon by plaintiffs' experts
insufficient to establish causation), aff'd in part, 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002).
76. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 157 ("Although these studies are useful in proving that the
toxin is capable of harm, courts have found them inadmissible under Daubert as their inherent
weaknesses make it difficult to prove the specific toxin exposure caused the plaintiffs injuries.").
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specific causation. 7 Physicians use differential diagnosis to determine the cause78
of a patient's disease by ruling out probable causes until only one cause is left.
While courts prefer-and often demand-evidence derived from differential
diagnosis as proof of specific causation, 79 this methodology, nonetheless, falls
short of definitively proving the cause of a plaintiff's injury.8 ° Consider, for
example, Doe v. Ortho-ClinicalDiagnostics, Inc.,81 a case that illustrates the
problems associated with using differential diagnosis to prove specific causation.
In Doe, the parents of an autistic child alleged that thimerosal contained in the
defendant drug manufacturer's vaccine caused their child to develop autism.82
While the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the burden of proving general
causation, usually a prerequisite to a court's consideration of specific
causation, 84 the court nonetheless considered whether the plaintiffs could prove
specific causation. As evidence of specific causation, the plaintiffs presented
an expert medical witness who testified on his use of differential diagnosis to
determine that thimerosal was the cause of the child's autism.86 However, based
on its finding that the expert "fail[edl to take into account the existence of such a

77. See Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis
Testimony to Prove Causationin Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law,
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, Autumn 2001, at 107, 111 ("Because courts have generally
refused to relieve the plaintiff from proving specific causation, differential diagnosis evidence is
often a crucial component of the plaintiffs case.").
78. See id. at 107-08; see also Wendy Michelle Ertmer, Note, Just What the Doctor
Ordered: The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis in PharmaceuticalProduct Litigation, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1240 (2003) ("As with differential diagnosis of a disease, clinicians
attempting to determine the cause of the disease make a list of potential causal agents and, through a
process of elimination, identify the agent that remains on the list as the most likely cause of the
disease.").
79. See Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 77, at 111.
80. See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) ("A
differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account of other potential causes may be so lacking
that it cannot provide a reliable basis for an opinion on causation."); see also Ertmer, supra note 78,
at 1252-53 (citing Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1019, 1028 (E.D.
Mo. 2000), afftd, 252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001)) (describing case where plaintiff's experts "relied on
differential diagnosis methodology to form their opinion that [the prescription drug] caused the
plaintiff's stroke" and "[t]he court suggested that a differential diagnosis opinion on causation is
unreliable whenever that expert has not also formed an opinion, based on scientific studies, on
general causation").
81. 440 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
82. Id. at 468.
83. Id. at 476.
84. See id. (finding that "the Court need not go further"); see also Mack v.
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., 671 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (D. Md. 2009) (describing general
causation as "an essential prerequisite to proving specific causation" (quoting Foster v. Legal Sea
Foods, Inc., No. CCB-03-2512, 2008 WL 2945561, at *10 (D. Md. July 25, 2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
85. Doe, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 476 ("Nevertheless, for sake of completeness, the Court will also
examine [the medical expert's] methodology concerning specific causation, that is, whether
RhoGAM specifically caused Minor Child Doe's autism.").
86. Id.
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strong likelihood of a currently unknown genetic cause of autism, '' s the court
concluded that the expert's differential diagnosis was not properly performed
and could not be admitted as evidence of causation.88 Thus, as courts seek more
precise evidence of causation in toxic tort litigation, even evidence obtained
using the best available scientific methodologies, like differential diagnosis, may
be excluded.89

An understanding of these deficiencies in available scientific evidence
provides the basis for establishing a court's need for advanced scientific
methodologies to determine causation in toxic tort litigation, especially where
prescription drugs are alleged to cause plaintiffs' injuries. 90 As Professor David
Owen explains, "[d]rugs... are different," 9 1 and they provide unique and
difficult challenges to the American tort system.92 Fortunately, genetic research
is rapidly advancing 93 and producing the very information about the causes of
human disease that courts desire.
Using Genetic Research to Improve Courts' Decisions in Toxic Tort Cases

Genetic research towers. over its rival scientific methodologies with its
ability to provide answers to many of the questions that have, so far, stumped the
courts. 94 As this research continues to develop, and as courts begin to admit it
into toxic tort litigation, plaintiffs and defendants alike will benefit, 95 as

87. Id. at 478.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) (making
it clear that the methodology used by a plaintiff to prove causation cannot "fail[] to take serious
account of other potential causes [such that it would bel so lacking that it cannot provide a reliable
basis for an opinion on causation").
90. See Ertmer, supra note 78, at 1241 ("The diagnosis of adverse drug reactions is
substantially more complex, however, precisely because the association between the causal agent
(the drug) and the disease is not well established.").
91. OWEN, supra note 48, at 572 & n.33.
92. Professor Owen continues:
Many have been bewitched, bedazzled, and bewildered in attempting to figure just
how principles of design defectiveness should be applied to prescription drugs ....
Whether and how prescription drugs in particular should be treated differently from other
types of products has consumed more time and effort, and resulted in the gnashing of
more teeth, than about any other particularized issue in all of products liability law.
OWEN, supra note 48, at 566-67 (footnote omitted). See Ertmer, supra note 78, at 1263 ("The
admissibility of expert testimony to prove causation is one of the most difficult issues facing trial
courts in pharmaceutical product liability litigation.").
93. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2011).
94. See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 3, at 8 ("New genetic methods and data have the potential
to fill some of the scientific uncertainties and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, thus making toxic tort
litigation more accurate and fair."); Callahan, supra note 2, at 163-64 ("Molecular epidemiological
studies are perfectly suited to prove individual causation because ... the use of biomarkers
identifies the specific cause of the plaintiff's disease.").
95. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 165.
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illustrated by the following discussion of Penny's potential claims and
Columbia's potential defenses.
To begin, consider the ability of genetic research to reveal new information
about how certain substances affect the human body. 96 Suppose that genetic
research is conducted to expose human genes to the active ingredient found in
Valtor, and the research results in new information showing that when healthy
genes are exposed to this ingredient, they mutate in a way that leads to the
development of leukemia. Of course, assuming that it was not possible for
Columbia to discover this information prior to placing Valtor on the market,
Columbia will not be liable for defective design or warnings claims. 97 However,
this discovery transforms a once unknown danger into a foreseeable one, and one
where federal regulators, as well as Columbia, must balance the risks and
benefits of Valtor in determining whether to keep the drug on the market and
what warnings to include with the drug. 98 This new information will
undoubtedly tilt the scale in the direction of greater risks. Thus, if Columbia
continues to market Valtor after learning of this potential danger and fails to take
any available and reasonable precautions to make the drug safer or to warn about
the danger, 99 it risks a court's determination that upon discovery of this danger,
Valtor became unreasonably dangerous and Columbia became liable for
defective design and warning claims. 1°° Where future plaintiffs are able to
connect this defect to their development of leukemia, Columbia will face
significantly increased liability in toxic tort claims.' 0 '
Next, consider a scenario in which genetic research reveals information that
the active ingredient in Valtor, while once believed to have the capacity to cause
leukemia in only a small number of individuals, is found to have the potential to
cause this disease in many more individuals. For example, it is possible that
scientists once believed that very few individuals were genetically susceptible to
harm caused by Valtor. However, genetic research then reveals information
showing that numerous individuals carry a genetic susceptibility to harm caused
by Valtor. Now, the general rule that a "product [must] contain[] an ingredient

96. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 147 (citing David J. Hunter, The Future of Molecular
Epidemiology, 28 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY S1012, S1014 (1999)) ("[M]olecular epidemiology links
exposure and the onset of disease.").
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("Most
courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, the balancing of risks and benefits
in judging product design and marketing must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and riskavoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution.").
98. See id. § 2 cmt. k ("[T]his reflects the same risk-utility balancing undertaken in warnings
cases generally.").
99. See id. § 2(b)-(c).
100. See id. § 2 cmt. k.
101. See id. ("Clearly the plaintiff in most cases must show that the allergic predisposition is
not unique to the plaintiff.... [H]owever, the court may properly consider the severity of the
plaintiffs harm. The more severe the harm, the more justified is a conclusion that the number of
persons at risk need not be large to be considered 'substantial' so as to require a warning.").
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to which a substantial number of the population are allergic"' 1 2 in order for a
seller to be required to warn of the danger, may be replaced with a new duty
imposed upon Columbia to warn of the danger. 1°3 This is especially true given
the general rule that the "degree of substantiality is not precisely quantifiable"104
and courts' previous decisions holding manufacturers liable for their failure to
warn, even where only small percentages of people were known to be
susceptible to the product's risks at issue. 10 5 Considering that a court held a
manufacturer responsible for a danger known to affect less than two percent of
the general population,'0 6 any new information increasing the number of
individuals susceptible to developing leukemia by using Valtor will increase the
likelihood
that Columbia will be held liable for its failure to warn of the
107

danger.

It is also important to consider a scenario in which genetic research does not
reveal information about new health dangers associated with Valtor or increased
numbers of individuals susceptible to harm from use of the drug, but instead
provides additional evidence showing that the development of leukemia from the
use of Valtor is limited to extremely rare cases in which individuals have
unusual genetic susceptibilities. In this scenario, if Columbia is able to obtain
genetic testing of Penny, and if such testing reveals that she is one of the rare
individuals carrying this unique susceptibility to Valtor, Columbia's
0 8 defensebased in the idiosyncratic response doctrine-will be strengthened.1
Additionally, as mentioned in Part I, genetic testing stands to have the
greatest impact on the element of causation. 1° 9 And, as discussed in Part II
above, scientists are currently engaged in molecular epidemiological studies that
assess the effects of certain substances on the human body."
These studies
continue to reveal new biomarkers that show that genes have been exposed to
particular substances, l t thus unveiling "'fingerprints' of specific carcinogens,

102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
103. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 16 ("These cases are the first in what is likely to become
an increasingly frequent type of legal claim in which a plaintiff contends that a manufacturer has a
duty to identify and warn about possible genetic susceptibilities to its products.").
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. k.
105. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grumman Allied Indus., 478 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144-45 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (affirming denial of summary judgment motion by a bus manufacturer liable for its failure to
warn of a danger caused by a chemical found in the dashboard of the bus which was known to affect
less than two percent of the population).
106. See id. at 144.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. k.

108. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 12 ("Additionally, defendants could also seek to test
plaintiffs for the presence of other genetic traits that might predispose the plaintiffs to the illnesses
they have developed. Defendants would use such findings to support alternative causation
arguments, namely, that the plaintiffs' own genotypes, rather than exposure to the defendants' toxic
substances, caused or contributed to the plaintiffs' illnesses.").
109. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11; see also Marchant, supra note 3, at 8.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
111. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 151 (citing Perera & Weinstein, supra note 29, at 517).
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associating a specific carcinogen with a specific mutation."' 1 2 Furthermore, not
only can biomarkers present evidence that a person has been exposed to a
particular substance, but they can also provide direct proof that such exposure
led to development of a disease like cancer.11 3 To understand the implications of

this research on a toxic tort claim, consider a situation in which genetic research
produces information showing that a particular inherited genetic characteristic
can lead to the development of leukemia without any interference from outside
substances. 14 In this hypothetical, Columbia will likely seek genetic testing to
determine whether Penny has this genetic characteristic, and where the results of
this testing show that Penny carries the genetic trait in question, Columbia will
defend itself against Penny's claim by arguing that Penny's own genes are to
blame for causing her leukemia." 5
Moreover, just as proof that Penny carried the genetic characteristics at issue
here would increase Columbia's chances of successfully defending against her
claim, proof that Penny does not carry a genetic characteristic that she claims to
carry can make or break her claim. 116 For example, consider a situation in which
Penny claims to carry a genetic mutation known to lead to the development of7
leukemia and known to be caused by exposure to Valtor's active ingredient."
Genetic testing will provide definitive proof favoring Penny's claim or
Columbia's defense, depending on whether it offers proof that Penny carries the
genetic characteristic or provides for the absence of such proof. 118 This
proposition is illustrated in Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 119 where the

112. See id. at 154 (citing Perera & Weinstein, supra note 29, at 519).
113. See id. at 154-55 (citing Perera & Weinstein, supra note 29, at 519) ("Recent studies
suggest mutations in oncogenes ... and in tumor suppressor genes... may be used as biomarkers to
directly prove exposure to a specific carcinogen leading to cancer.").
114. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 13 (citing Bowen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No.
Civ.A. 97C-06-194 CH, 2005 WL 1952859 (Del. Super. Ct. June 23, 2005)) (describing a case in
which a "defendant obtained genetic testing of a plaintiff whose birth defect was allegedly caused
by prenatal exposure to Benlate and demonstrated, to the satisfaction of both the plaintiff's lead
expert and the court, that the disability was caused by a specific inherited genetic mutation rather
than chemical exposure").
115. See, e.g., Hoffman & Rothenberg, supra note 17, at 867 n.20 (listing cases in which
defendants argued that plaintiffs' injuries were caused by their own genetics). But see Marchant,
supra note 3, at 12 n. 17 (listing cases where defendants' claims that plaintiffs' genetics caused their
injuries failed due to insufficient evidence to substantiate the defenses).
116. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 11-12 (citing Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
2d 574, 575, 579 (E.D. Tex. 2005)) (discussing Easter, in which genetic testing revealed that the
plaintiff did not have the pertinent genetic susceptibility and suggesting that "defendants might use
the absence of the pertinent susceptibility genes in a plaintiff to buttress their arguments against
causation").
117. See Barry B. Cepelewicz & Eric Watt Wiechmann, Genetic Injury in Toxic Tort Cases:
What Science Can and Cannot Prove, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 201, 202 (1995) ("in an increasing number
of instances, plaintiffs have argued that exposure to a toxin created a change in their chromosomes,
thereby increasing their risk of some disease, usually cancer, in the future.").
118. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 8.
119. 362 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2004).
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widow of a former smoker brought a products liability claim against several
cigarette manufacturers, alleging that her husband died as a result of smoking
their cigarettes. 120 The defendant manufacturers presented expert testimony that
tissue samples obtained from the husband's body did not show the genetic
changes associated with smoking, 12' but instead provided evidence of damage
caused by the husband's exposure to asbestos and mineral fibers. 122 Thus, the
court of appeals refused to overturn
123 the lower court's decision favoring the
defendant cigarette manufacturers.
Alternatively, suppose that in response to Penny's claim that Valtor caused
her leukemia, Columbia obtains information about other prescription drugs that
Penny has taken and, additionally, finds scientific information showing that the
use of another drug, "Drug B," can cause a certain gene mutation that has a high
likelihood of leading to the development of leukemia. Suppose also that Penny
confirms that she has used Drug B and agrees to undergo genetic testing. Where
the testing reveals that she has been exposed to Drug B, Columbia will defend
against liability for Penny's injury b arguing that this information points to
Drug B as the cause of her leukemia.
In addition to providing direct evidence of causation by using genetic
evidence, Penny and Columbia may both benefit by presenting genetic evidence
in support of inferences. For example, consider a case in which an individual
brought a workers' compensation claim, alleging that his exposure to benzene
caused him to develop chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML). 125 While the
plaintiff in this case was not subject to the same standards of proof of causation
that are imposed on toxic tort litigants, 126 the case illustrates an important avenue
for plaintiffs and defendants to pursue using genetic evidence in toxic tort

litigation. Here, the plaintiff prevailed by presenting expert testimony linking
benzene to one form of leukemia and subsequently using this causational link to
infer that benzene caused the plaintiff's particular leukemia. 27 Similarly, should
Penny be able to present genetic information showing that Valtor's active
ingredient has a significant likelihood of causing another type of leukemia,

120. Id. at 885.

121. Id. at 890 & n.5.
122. Id. at 890.
123. Id. at 896.
124. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 768 & n.67 (3d

ed. 2000) (listing cases in which defendant attempted to prove its product was not a substantial

factor for causing plaintiffs harm).
125. See Casdorph v. W. Va. Office Ins. Comm'r, 690 S.E.2d 102, 105 (W. Va. 2009).
126. See id. at 113 (observing that "the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to workers'
compensation claims").
127. Id. at 109 ("[The plaintiffs expert] noted that it is generally accepted by the scientific
community that benzene exposure can cause acute myelogenous leukemia... and after analyzing
several case studies, he believed that they were persuasive enough to allow him to state to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that exposure to benzene and other hydrocarbons were
probably causative in the development of the Appellant's CML.").
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Penny may be able to provide genetic evidence of her exposure to Valtor
12 8in order
to present a strong inference that the drug caused her type of leukemia.
Alternatively, Columbia may build its own inferences of alternative causes
of Penny's leukemia by presenting genetic evidence that Penny carries a genetic
mutation that causes similar forms of leukemia without any interference from
outside substances, t29 or by showing that other factors, for example, chemicals
found in the water that Penny drinks, are known to cause similar types of
leukemia. 130 These examples reveal Columbia's ability to use inferences to
establish arguments for alternative causes of Penny's leukemia.
While concededly simplistic, the examples above illustrate the capacity of
genetic research to provide the conclusive evidence' that other scientific
methodologies have been unable to produce and that courts faced with toxic tort
claims have long desired. 132 However, despite the incredible potential for
genetic research to transform toxic tort litigation, the degree to which courts will
133
be willing to admit genetic evidence in toxic tort litigation is unclear.
Admittedly, for any of the benefits of genetic research to be realized by courts
and toxic tort34 litigants, trial court judges, serving in their capacity as
"gatekeepers,"' must first admit genetic evidence. However, given the fact that
courts seem to have set epidemiological studies and differential diagnoses as the
baseline for determining whether scientific evidence is reliable, 35 it seems
unlikely that evidence obtained through advances in genetic research will be
excluded.' 36 Furthermore, it is important to note that federal and state courts

128. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 164-65.
129. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 12.
130. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 124, at 768.
131. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 164 ("[Ulnlike differential diagnosis that only rules out
other possible causes of disease, the use of biomarkers identifies the specific cause of the plaintiffs
disease.").
132. See Marchant, supra note 3, at 7-8.
133. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 148 ("Although a few authors have suggested the use of
this type of genetic evidence in toxic tort litigation, they have not addressed admissibility of the
evidence under the Daubert standard."); see also Childs, supra note 10, at 443 ("[W]hether courts
are willing to recognize and accept toxicogenomics as a new science that can objectively
demonstrate how chemicals impact a disease process early in the chain of causation is still an open
question."); Mark S. Ellinger, DNA Diagnostic Technology: Probing the Problem of Causation in
Toxic Torts, 3 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 31, 50 (1990) (discussing the use of DNA tests in toxic tort
litigation and its potential admissibility under the Frye standard); Randi B. Weiss et al., The Use of
Genetic Testing in the Courtroom, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 910-12 (1999) (discussing the
use of genetic changes as proof of causation in toxic torts).
134. See Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 445, 699 S.E.2d 169, 174 (2010).
135. See Callahan, supra note 2, at 160.
136. See id. at 163 ("Courts will probably find molecular epidemiological studies reliable
under Daubert as these studies prove individual causation by linking exposure with the plaintiffs
disease."). But see Niccol Kording & Janine P. DuMontelle, An Overview of Admissibility of
Genetic Test Results in Federal Civil Actions: An Uncertain Destiny, 19 WflrlIER L. REV. 681,
690 (1998) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) ("[G]enetic
testing... is speculative and can not pass the relevancy requirement of Daubert for scientific
evidence.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss4/11

16

Hite: Who's to Blame: How Genetic Information Will Lead to More Accurat

2012]

GENETIC INFORMATION IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION

routinely use genetic information,'

37

1047

particularly in criminal and paternity

t

and courts have already begun to admit genetic information in toxic
cases,
139
Moreover, some courts have specifically pointed to the lack of
litigation.
tort

evidence of genetic information in toxic tort cases, highlighting their interest in
considering such information in the future.t40
IV. ADVANCING WITH SCIENCE: WHY COURTS SHOULD INCORPORATE GENETIC
EVIDENCE INTO Toxic TORT LITIGATION

As genetic research has advanced, arguments for and against the use of
genetic evidence in toxic tort cases have grown louder. 14 1 Proponents of courts'

use of genetic evidence argue that it holds the key to conclusively identifying
causation in toxic tort litigation, 142 while critics of such use argue that the touted

benefits of genetic evidence are mostly yet to be realized. 143 Additionally, some

critics have raised concerns that the introduction of genetic information could
adversely affect plaintiffs' lives outside of the courtroom if personal genetic
information becomes public. 144 However, review of federal legislation enacted
in recent years 145 suggests that these concerns have been addressed by the

137. See Weiss et al., supra note 133, at 906 & n.187, 913.
138. See Jordan K. Garrison, Courts Face the Exciting and the Inevitable: DNA in Civil Trials,
23 REV. LITIG. 435, 435-36 (2004); see also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (affirming the trial judge's decision to admit the results of DNA testing in criminal
case).
139. See Hoffman & Rothenberg, supra note 17, at 867; Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Science Fact
or Science Fiction? The Implications of Court-Ordered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 U.S.F.
L. REV. 295, 296 (2000) ("The use of genetics has now made its way into the civil courtroom as
well.").
140. See Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc.. 440 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
141. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 11, at 393 ("So far, the scholarship has been split between a
prophetic and a skeptical view of the new science's likely impact [on toxic tort litigation].").
142. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 138, at 460 ("Within the legal system, the courts must face
genetic evidence as the newest scientific advance and embrace it for the information it can
provide."); Gold, supra note 11, at 401 ("The touted promise of toxicogenomics for providing
particularistic evidence-at long last opening the black box-may lead courts to conclude that the
grail is found. In some cases it probably will be." (footnote omitted)).
143. See, e.g., Poulter, supra note 32, at 216 ("[U]ncertainties suggest caution in using genetic
information in analyzing the role of toxic substances in causing a particular instance of disease.").
144. See, e.g., Weiss et al., supra note 133, at 913 ("As genetic testing becomes more
sophisticated, it will have many applications in the legal system. Complex legal questions regarding
privacy, discrimination, and insurance coverage are likely to arise with wider use of genetic
testing."); see also Rohan Hebbar, The Impact of the Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct on
Sports Employers: A Game of Balancing Money, Morality, and Privacy, 8 WILLAMETTE SPORTS
L.J. 52, 54 (2011) (citing Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 226 (2000)) ("Health
insurance companies and employers who have access to the results of genetic tests may use these
results to deny coverage or refuse to hire someone based on their genetic defects.").
145. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting
discrimination in insurance based on genetic information); Health Insurance Portability and
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imposition of significant new protections for individuals' personal genetic
information which prohibit access to, and discriminatory use of, this information
by health insurers,' employers, 147 and others. 148 Furthermore, trial court judges
share a long history of evaluating scientific evidence for admissibility purposes,
and the Federal Rules of Evidence require that they "ensure that any and all
49
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'
Therefore, where questions regarding the reliability of genetic evidence are at
issue, the trial courts are well-positioned to render admissibility determinations.
Overall, the above concerns are far outweighed by the benefits that toxic tort
litigation stands to reap as scientists continue to discover genetic evidence
linking toxic substances to widespread diseases. Information gleaned from this
research will allow plaintiffs and defendants to break through evidentiary
barriers that have long frustrated their arguments' 50 and will put to rest many of
the uncertainties that continue to plague toxic tort cases. Genetic evidence
should play a key role in future toxic tort litigation by providing the conclusive
evidence courts need to effectively determine fault.
Allison Hite

Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181(b)(1)(B), 1182(a)(1)(F) (2006) (same);
Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives From the U.S.
Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 693, 693 (2010) (citing GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881) (discussing the purpose and impact of GINA); Roberts, supra note 15, at 442 ("Congress
passed GINA in response to scientific advancements that advocates feared could result in a new
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